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LAW HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES 
ILAN WURMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
A common line of attack against originalists is that lawyers just aren’t 
good at doing history.  But in his famous book Historians’ Fallacies, David 
Hackett Fischer noted that many historians aren’t good at doing history 
either: They often fall into one or more of numerous fallacies that he 
catalogued in his celebrated and often devastating three-hundred-page book. 
This article points out the many ways in which originalists and other legal 
historians fall into, but also how they may avoid, some of the same fallacies 
committed by the historians whose works made their way into Fischer’s 
book.  It will then point to corresponding lessons that lawyers-turned-
historians ought to employ to write better history.  The belief is that 
lawyers, judges, and legal academics can become good—or at least better—
historians. 
Part II confronts two general attacks on the use of history, both of 
which challenge the possibility of obtaining relevant and objective 
historical knowledge.  Part III establishes the importance of investigative 
questions and describes fallacies of question-framing that lead originalists 
astray.  Part IV explores fallacies of factual verification that stem from 
reliance on flawed types of evidence.  Part V addresses one fallacy of 
factual significance—which we shall call the originalist’s fallacy—that 
leads some originalists to misunderstand the significance of certain 
evidence.  Part VI illustrates fallacies of narration, including fallacies of 
anachronism and presentism, that too often create fruitless investigations 
and provide ahistorical answers.  Part VII, although recognizing the 
importance of generalization, demonstrates how originalists (and other legal 




 * Associate, Winston & Strawn LLP. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2013. Thanks to the usual 
suspects, and to some new ones: William Baude, Sean Bland, Jud Campbell, Brenner Fissell, 
Philip Hamburger, Michael McConnell, Torsten Menge, Brendan Selby, Julie Silverbrook, 
Kenneth Young. This article was written when I was clerking for Judge Jerry E. Smith of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whom I also thank for allowing me the time to think and 
write about such things. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his celebrated work, Historians’ Fallacies,1 David Hackett Fischer 
catalogued and described over one hundred fallacies common in historical 
literature.  The aim of Fischer’s book was to help refine the study of history 
and not to impugn its relevance or utility.  Many scholars have criticized 
originalism for demanding historical analysis for which lawyers are simply 
 
1. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES (1970).  
         
2015] LAW HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES 163 
ill equipped; others have criticized originalist scholarship and judicial 
opinions for committing various historical errors; and yet others assail 
originalism altogether as a method of obtaining its adherents’ preferred 
outcomes.  As this article will show, many of these attacks are legitimate: 
many originalists do in fact commit errors of historical methodology that 
should bring their conclusions into doubt.  Yet this article demonstrates that 
many of these errors commonly appear in all historical literature, whether 
originalist or not, and can be avoided with careful practice.   
This article will rely on David Hackett Fischer’s definitions to explain 
several of the common fallacies that appear in the academic literature and in 
judicial opinions.  It will survey the works of both originalist academics and 
general historians, both liberal and conservative.  It aims to provide a kind 
of toolkit or guide for originalist lawyers, judges, and academics so they 
can more readily identify and remedy these common errors.2  This article 
assumes, then, that historical knowledge is relevant for constitutional and 
legal analysis and seeks to help lawyers be a bit better at it.3 
Before addressing more specific examples of common fallacies and 
demonstrating their commission in various originalist articles and judicial 
opinions, Part II addresses general attacks on the possibility of historical 
knowledge because identifying methodological errors does little good if one 
believes that historical knowledge—or at least the relevant historical 
knowledge—is impossible to attain.  Although tomes can be written on this 
debate and academics of several disciplines continue to argue over it, I 
would like merely to suggest a few common-sense reasons to think that 
historical knowledge is possible and attainable.  And, fittingly, David 
Hackett Fischer has described certain fallacies that appertain to these issues 
as well. 
Part III will introduce fallacies of question-framing that originalists 
often commit.  These fallacies lead originalists astray because they consist 
in a failure to ask the right kinds of questions.  If, for example, an 
originalist investigator begins his historical inquiry by asking whether 
sovereign immunity is rooted in common law and defeasible by statute or is 
an indefeasible natural law doctrine, he may completely miss alternative 
 
2. Although some historians have challenged parts of Fischer’s work, it remains widely read 
and celebrated.  That said, Fischer’s authority on these matters should not be taken as self-evident. 
I do not think that all of the “fallacies” he describes, for many of which he invented names, are in 
fact fallacies.  He nonetheless provides a good starting point for a methodological study. Each of 
the fallacies discussed here are described in some detail so the reader can decide for himself 
whether they are persuasive.  The ones selected, in my view, all have merit.  
3. Indeed, even non-originalists recognize that history is relevant to non-originalist 
constitutional theory.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 650-51, 668-72, 717-19 (2013). 
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possibilities such as that sovereign immunity was in fact a doctrine of 
personal jurisdiction with other attributes altogether.  He will have 
committed the fallacy of false dichotomous questions. 
Part IV will discuss fallacies of factual verification involving reliance 
on flawed types of evidence.  The most common fallacy of this sort in the 
literature—and it has become rampant in judicial opinions—is the fallacy of 
negative proof that consists in declaring that if there is no evidence that X is 
the case, then not-X is in fact the case.  This fallacy has potentially led to 
erroneous conclusions in the anti-commandeering judicial opinions and 
literature and has reared its head in numerous other places.  This Part will 
also devote some attention to the fallacy of the reversible reference that 
consists in using evidence for a proposition that, without more, is literally 
meaningless because the evidence could also stand for precisely the 
opposite proposition. 
Part V will then discuss one fallacy of factual significance, which it 
will refer to as the originalist’s fallacy, that was unknown to Fischer 
because it is only relevant to originalist history.  It is the idea that the best 
originalist evidence must be culled from before the date of drafting or 
ratification of the Constitution or its amendments.  This proposition is utter 
nonsense, and as trivial as the point may seem, a surprising number of 
originalists seem to accept it at least occasionally.  Even if originalists 
believe that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed at the time of 
enactment, that does not mean that the only evidence we can use to 
determine that meaning must date from before the enactment.  Nor does it 
mean that, if such evidence exists, it will be the best evidence. 
Part VI illustrates various fallacies of narration, and particularly the 
fallacy of anachronism and the fallacy of presentism, a special kind of 
anachronism.  This fallacy consists in misinterpreting history by ignoring 
past threads that have become unfamiliar to the modern world, or which 
have become irrelevant to the modern world but which were familiar and 
important in the past.  There are several examples of this fallacy and other 
anachronisms at work, but the history of judicial review is a particularly 
important area in which this fallacy may be often committed. 
Part VII, finally, describes fallacies of generalization.  Although 
generalizations are unavoidable and necessary, originalists often improperly 
generalize by relying on insufficient statistical samples and on lonely facts, 
or by applying double standards to evidence so that inconvenient facts are 
unjustifiably explained away. 
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II.  PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
For any of the fallacies described here to be of use, one must first be 
persuaded that history is useful to begin with for legal analysis.  There are 
many attacks on the relevance of history, but here I focus on the key 
objection that historical knowledge is not objective or is too indeterminate 
to be useful.   Conveniently, Fischer describes fallacies in his work that may 
offer some insight into these objections. 
A. THE HISTORICIST CLAIM 
The historicist claim consists in the following notion: if we cannot 
operate without modern presuppositions, then we can never obtain objective 
or useful historical knowledge.  The originalist enterprise is therefore 
impossible.  There are varying degrees of historicism, from the proposition 
that historical knowledge may be true and “objective” but only relative to 
its particular time and place to the proposition that no objective knowledge 
is possible at all.4 
G. Edward White has demonstrated this kind of historicism in the 
constitutional scholarship of the 1960s–70s.  White surveyed the “growing 
view of scholars in fields once associated with historico-politics that 
properly conducted historical inquiry illuminated only the past and was thus 
irrelevant to contemporary social issues.”5  But the knowledge we could 
have about the past was still “objectiv[e],” investigated by a “disinterested 
. . . scientific investigator.”6  In other words, history can reveal objective 
truths, but these “truths” are only objective relative to a time and place; they 
 
4. Defining terms is extremely important.  Many legal academics have used the term 
“historicist” differently than I use it here.  By historicism I mean the school in the philosophy of 
history that is opposed to the notion of transcendental truth; all truths and values are relative to 
their time and place.  For a general introduction to this understanding of historicism, see LEO 
STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 9-34 (1953). 
 I do not use the term as Stephen M. Griffin or Richard Posner, for example, use it.  Griffin 
has defined historicism as follows: “A historicist perspective focuses on the contexts in which 
historical events took place and how those contexts were later changed.”  Stephen M. Griffin, 
Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (2008).  Historicism is not simply the 
attempt to understand history in context.  By definition that is what history is.  To say that 
originalists are not historicist because they fail to appreciate the contexts of the various pasts is to 
distort originalism, as Griffin does, see id., about which I shall have more to say later.  See infra 
text accompanying note 72. 
 As for Posner, G. Edward White correctly describes his use of the term historicist as akin to 
“historically oriented.”  See G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional 
Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485, 490 n.8 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, 
Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
573, 574, 593-96 (2000).  
5. White, supra note 4, at 506.  
6. Id. at 494.  
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tell us nothing enduring.7  Historicist legal thinkers in the 1930s–40s, 
therefore, “assumed that since the present never duplicated the past, there 
was little point in attempting to resolve present legal issues by invoking 
principles extracted from a legal source remote in time.”8  Finally, the great 
constitutional theorists of the 1960s–70s, such as Alexander Bickel, came 
“to realize that the past, in constitutional interpretation as in other fields, 
offers no specific answers to specific contemporary problems”; the role of 
history was “reduced to demonstrating ‘what one age finds worthy of note 
in another.’”9 
If historicists are right—and if the constitutional theorists of the 1960s–
70s were right to discount history—then originalism may be unworkable 
because it can never obtain answers to its questions as all historical answers 
are only relative to their own time and place.  This particular version of 
historicism, however, is not so lethal to originalism if the originalist 
argument is that the objective truths relative to the founders’ time are the 
relevant truths today by virtue of their enshrinement in the Constitution. 
Paul Brest demonstrates a slight variation on this historicism in his 
famous critique of originalism that presents a much greater challenge to 
originalism—and with which several modern scholars continue to agree.  
He argues that modern lawyers—all modern people, indeed—are unable 
truly to understand historical thought because of inescapable modern 
presuppositions.  In The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding, Brest approvingly quotes Quentin Skinner who made this 
observation vis-à-vis political theorists: 
[I]t will never in fact be possible simply to study what any given 
classical writer has said . . . without bringing to bear some of one’s 
own expectations about what he must have been saying 
. . . . [T]hese models and preconceptions in terms of which we 
unavoidably organize and adjust our perceptions and thoughts will 
themselves tend to act as determinants of what we think or 
perceive. . . .  The perpetual danger, in our attempts to enlarge our 
 
7. That is also how Leo Strauss has described historicism.  Cf. STRAUSS, supra note 4, at 16 
(“In trying to discover standards which, while being objective, were relative to particular historical 
situations, the historical school assigned to historical studies a much greater importance than they 
had ever possessed.”).  
8. White, supra note 4, at 522.  
9. Id. at 566.  The progressive notion in historicism may have contributed to the views of 
these scholars.  See id. at 513-18, 609-14.  If history progresses, that is, if mankind’s knowledge 
and understanding progress over historical time in the same way that our knowledge of the natural 
sciences progress, why should principles of another age have any bearing on modern legal 
interpretation?  We are much wiser than they were, and so we should not look to the past for an 
understanding of present problems. 
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historical understanding, is thus that our expectations about what 
someone must be saying or doing will themselves determine that 
we understand the agent to be doing something which he would 
not—or even could not—himself have accepted as an account of 
what he was doing.10 
Brest then suggests that his reader study specific areas of constitutional 
history to see “the problem of doing original history” and the “elusiveness 
of the original understanding” because of such presuppositions.11  Mark 
Tushnet has made the same criticism.12 
Brest concludes that because all historians have presuppositions, the 
relevant historical knowledge is therefore impossible.  It stems from the 
idea that truth is only relative to a particular time and place and therefore 
we cannot understand prior truths because our own, different, historical 
existences inescapably color everything about our own understandings. 
William Nelson has described Brest’s and Tushnet’s view of history in 
a way that clarifies nicely the relativist quality of this kind of historicism.13 
Their “contextualist” view, along with those of other “critical legal 
scholars,” holds that all historical knowledge is merely giving present 
 
10. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 219 (1980) (quoting Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 
HIST. & THEORY 3, 6 (1969)) (brackets and first two sets of ellipses in Brest’s original). Brest 
repeats this concern a few pages later, explaining that one need not assume that historical 
knowledge is completely impossible to appreciate its indeterminacies; but the point is essentially 
the same.  Id. at 221-22 (“Even when the interpreter performs the more conventional historian’s 
role, one may wonder whether the task is possible.  There is a hermeneutic tradition, of which 
Hans-Georg Gadamar is the leading modern proponent, which holds that we can never understand 
the past in its own terms, free from our prejudices and preconceptions.  We are hopelessly 
imprisoned in our own world-views; we can shed some preconceptions only to adopt others, with 
no reason to believe that they are the conceptions of the different society that we are trying to 
understand.  One need not embrace this essentially solipsistic view of historical knowledge to 
appreciate the indeterminate and contingent nature of the historical understanding that an 
originalist historian seeks to achieve.”).  
11. Id. at 219.  
12. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983) (“The internal critique cuts deeper; it 
undermines in several steps the plausibility of interpretivism as a constitutional theory.  The first 
step is an argument that interpretivism must rest on an account of historical knowledge more 
subtle than the naive presumption that past attitudes and intentions are directly accessible to 
present understanding.  The second step identifies the most plausible such account, the view—
sometimes called hermeneutics—that historical understanding requires an imaginative 
transposition of former world views into the categories of our own.  The third step is an argument 
that such an imaginative transposition implies an ambiguity that is inconsistent with the project of 
liberal constitutional theory (and interpretivism).  The project of imaginative transposition can be 
carried through in a number of different ways, with a number of different results, none of which is 
more “correct”‘ than the others.  The existence of such an indeterminacy means that 
interpretivism, unless it falls back on nonliberal assumptions, cannot constrain judges sufficiently 
to carry out the liberal project of avoiding judicial tyranny.”); see also id. at 793-804.  
13. William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 1237 (1986).  
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meaning to past facts.  In this act of translating the past into present 
meaning, the historian, “as he renders the past meaningful in the present, 
cannot avoid changing its meaning, just as the Egyptologist who translates 
hieroglyphics into English through Greek can at best only approximate their 
original meaning.”14  The change that the historian begets depends on his 
particular point of view.  “A contextualist historian selects one historical 
interpretation in preference to another on the basis of its consistency with 
his own value system or world view, or that of his audience.”15  David 
Strauss has made this same point.16 
We should notice that these historicisms have a quality of relativism. 
Fischer argues that relativist historicism is fallacious because some facts are 
simply true from all perspectives.17  Indeed, common sense suggests that 
historicism is wrong in at least some obvious circumstances relevant to 
originalism.  For example, no matter from what perspective one looks at it, 
the Eleventh Amendment was intended to overturn Chisolm v. Georgia. 
That piece of historical knowledge may not be enough standing alone to 
answer any particular question on sovereign immunity, but that piece of 
knowledge is relevant to such an inquiry and it is indisputable.  Nelson 
provides several examples of historical questions relevant to originalists in 
which a historicist would be hard-pressed to come up with more than one 
answer to the particular question.18  Fischer additionally argues that merely 
because all historical knowledge is incomplete does not mean it is false.19 
I think, moreover, that a serious question is raised about historicism 
because it appears to be self-contradictory: If all knowledge is relative to a 
particular time and place, and has no objective value beyond the partial 
perspective and presuppositions of the particular individual, then isn’t 
historicism itself merely one “perspective” unique to the cultural, 
intellectual, and historical context of its proponents?  Fischer explains that 
“relativists all argued that they and their friends were exempt from 
relativism in some degree.”20  As a more prominent political theorist of the 
last century has written, 
The historicist thesis is . . . exposed to a very obvious difficulty 
which cannot be solved but only evaded or obscured by 
 
14. Id. at 1243.  
15. Id. at 1244.  
16. David Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 137, 140-41.  Others have made the same point.  See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of 
Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 83, 91-92 (2010).  
17. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 42 n.4.  
18. Nelson, supra note 13, at 1257-59.  
19. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 42 n.4. 
20. Id. 
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considerations of a more subtle character.  Historicism asserts that 
all human thoughts or beliefs are historical, and hence deservedly 
destined to perish; but historicism itself is a human thought; hence 
historicism can be of only temporary validity, or it cannot be 
simply true.  To assert the historicist thesis means to doubt it and 
thus to transcend it. . . . Historicism thrives on the fact that it 
inconsistently exempts itself from its own verdict about all human 
thought.  The historicist thesis is self-contradictory or absurd.  We 
cannot see the historical character of “all” thought—that is, of all 
thought with the exception of the historicist insight and its 
implications—without transcending history, without grasping 
something trans-historical.21 
There are other common-sense reasons we might think historicism is 
not quite right.  Consider that we also have different presuppositions from 
person to person within a time and place; or within merely a short span of 
time; and so forth.  We already lose something in translating hieroglyphs to 
Greek itself, without yet another intermediating language.  To say, then, 
that objective historical knowledge is impossible is to say also that all 
knowledge is impossible.  If that is true, then any other legal method will be 
just as arbitrary as an originalist one because it will rely on some other 
knowledge that is still subjective. 
These preliminary observations are not intended to resolve the debate 
over the possibility of historical knowledge.  Obviously much more 
theoretical work would be necessary.  My point here is only that there are a 
number of common-sense reasons to assume that historical knowledge is 
possible. 
B. INDETERMINACY AND THE USES OF HISTORY 
With that reasonable assumption made, I would like to turn to a slightly 
different inquiry: what if there is no objective historical knowledge of the 
kind relevant to legal inquiries?  What if our objective historical knowledge 
is too indeterminate to provide us with answers to constitutional questions? 
David Strauss stresses this point often.  Again, I do not intend here to prove 
or disprove Strauss—but because his criticism is prominent, I would like to 
suggest a few common-sense reasons why his criticism does not seem quite 
right. 
He has written, 
 
21. STRAUSS, supra note 4, at 24-25. 
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On the most practical level, it is often impossible to uncover what 
the original understandings were: what people thought they were 
doing when they adopted the various provisions of the 
Constitution.  Discovering how people in the past thought about 
their world is the task of historians, and there is no reason to think 
that lawyers and judges are going to be good at doing that kind of 
history—especially when they are dealing with controversial legal 
issues that arouse strong sentiments.22 
Elsewhere he has written that “the originalist project [is] a particularly 
difficult, challenging form of intellectual history and one that often will, to 
the honest originalist, turn up the answer ‘I don’t know,’ or ‘there were 
various ideas and none clearly prevailed,’ or ‘they were just confused back 
then.’”23  “Too often,” he writes, “it will be just too hard to figure out the 
answers to the relevant historical questions.”24  Others have made these 
criticisms as well, and at least one originalist has written that it is perhaps 
the most universal criticism.25 
But Strauss’s criticisms hardly seem unique to originalism.  Surely it is 
true that history is more difficult to do objectively when dealing with 
“controversial legal issues that arouse strong sentiments.”26  But many 
historical questions are controversial and arouse strong sentiments—the 
effects of imperialism, the roots of slavery, the causes of the First World 
War—and yet we don’t give up the study of those topics. Surely it’s just as 
easy (or hard) to answer a legal history question as it is to answer any other 
historical question from the relevant period.  To be sure, Strauss’s criticism 
might be justified if what he means is that all history suffers from the 
problem of incomplete knowledge and indeterminacy, and so using history 
is not a good way to solve legal problems. 
On this count, we might glean some insight from Fischer.  As he 
explains, 
There are many objective truths to be told about the past—great 
and vital truths that are relevant and even urgent to the needs of 
mankind. But there is no whole truth to be discovered by a simple 
method of induction.  Every true historical statement is an answer 
to a question which a historian has asked.  Not to The Question. 
 
22. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 18 (2010).  
 23. David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 137, 140 (2011). 
24. Id. 
25. Thomas B. McAffee, Originalism and Indeterminacy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 429, 
429 (1996). 
26. STRAUSS, supra note 22, at 18.  
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Not to questions about everything. But to questions about 
something.27 
I think there is much truth, and common sense, to this statement. Some 
questions may be too broad to be of relevance, for example (and as we shall 
revisit later), whether the Constitution is on the whole a “classical liberal” 
constitution or a “civic republican” constitution.  But critics hardly show 
that all or even most questions of relevance to lawyers and constitutional 
scholars—for example, the meaning of the words “happen” and “the 
Session” in the Vacancies Clause—cannot produce particular and important 
truths or at least a circumscribed range of possibly true answers.28 
That last point is particularly important.  It may be that there is no one 
right answer to a constitutional question, but that does not mean history 
isn’t useful.  If the history can boil down the legal “answer” to two 
possibilities, that is worth something.  It means the courts cannot (if you are 
an originalist) impose a third possibility.  One prominent example will 
suffice to illustrate: the famous debate between Michael McConnell and 
Philip Hamburger over the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.  The 
debate centered on whether the clause guarantees religious exemptions from 
generally applicable laws; for example, whether the clause would require 
that generally applicable drug laws provide an exemption for Native 
Americans whose religious practices require using peyote.29  That was the 
issue, most recently, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.30 
The general dispute revolved around the “caveats” or “provisos” in 
early state free exercise clauses. McConnell argues that the provisos 
generally allowed for free exercise of religion except where the actions 
would not be “peaceable” or would disturb the “peace” or “safety” of the 
state.31  The implication he draws is that religious objectors could be 
exempt from generally applicable state laws,32 and only when their religious 
actions would disturb the peace or threaten the safety of the state could such 
 
27. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 5.  
28. See, e.g., infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.  
29. This was the question in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).  
30. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).  Though Hobby Lobby was based on a federal statute, the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which Congress passed in order to reinstate Free Exercise 
Clause jurisprudence as it existed prior to Smith.  
31. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1461-62 (1990).  Here is an example of one such proviso, 
from New York’s 1777 Constitution: “[T]he free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this 
State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so 
construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or 
safety of this State.”  Id. at 1456. 
32. Contra the decision in Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
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actions be suppressed. As McConnell writes, “[T]he state provisions make 
sense only if free exercise envisions religiously compelled exemptions from 
at least some generally applicable laws.”33 
Hamburger disputes this implication on the ground that “instead of 
implying that the right of free exercise was very extensive—that it 
permitted peaceable departure from civil law [(McConnell’s position)]—the 
caveats stated the conditions upon which religious liberty could be 
denied.”34  That is, a proviso “could have been a condition of the 
availability of a relatively narrow right of free exercise rather than a 
limitation on an otherwise very extensive right.”35  Put differently, the 
“right to free exercise” in the state constitutions was not self-defining, and it 
could have been understood as a narrow right. 
The McConnell-Hamburger disagreement can be useful for 
constitutional interpretation in at least two ways.  First, it may be that their 
debate reveals a range of originalist meaning.  Perhaps the Employment 
Division v. Smith test eliminating exemptions from generally applicable 
laws36 and the prior Sherbert v. Verner test adopting exemptions from 
generally applicable laws37 are both plausible interpretations in light of the 
originalist history.  That is useful insofar as we know that one of these two 
rules, or either of them, would be a legitimate interpretation of the text. 
Excluding other possibilities does not indicate total failure. 
Second, it may be that this debate can still provide us with an answer 
depending on the interpretive conventions we employ.  For original public 
meaning originalists, for instance, perhaps once the text is unclear, we need 
only rely on the preponderance of the evidence with respect to the original 
public meaning.  In that sense, while both Hamburger’s and McConnell’s 
versions provide significant evidence for their respective positions, perhaps 
one or the other provides a preponderance of the evidence.  Or perhaps an 
interpretive method that uses the founders’ idea of liquidation—the notion 
that the meaning of the text becomes determined by the first courts to 
interpret the text in light of particular controversies—can rely on this 
debate, too.  The argument would go as follows: There is originalist 
evidence suggesting one of two plausible meanings.  The early cases 
suggest that the courts (or the political branches) liquidated the meaning of 
 
33. McConnell, supra note 31, at 1462. 
34. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 919 (1992).  
35. Id. at 921.  
36. Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).  
37. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).  
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the clause in favor of one rule over the other.38  For example, it was unclear 
at the time of the founding whether the Ex Post Facto Clause should be 
interpreted by its plain meaning to include all retrospective legislation, or 
by its technical meaning to include only criminal cases.  Early 
interpretations settled on the technical and thus helped to “fix” or 
“liquidate” one rule over the other.39 
My point thus far has been to suggest some common-sense reasons 
why certain academic arguments against the use of history in legal analysis 
seem wrong.  At least, for purposes of this article, we can safely assume 
that historical knowledge is possible and also relevant.  We are thus ready 
to engage with the thrust of this article: the fallacies historians tend to 
commit and how we might avoid them. 
III. FALLACIES OF QUESTION-FRAMING 
Question-framing is important to any historical inquiry.  “A moment’s 
reflection,” writes David Hackett Fischer, “should suffice to establish the 
simple proposition that every historian, willy-nilly, must begin his research 
with a question.”40  A historian cannot simply absorb all facts in existence 
before coming to some conclusion.  He cannot know what facts are relevant 
without first asking a question.  He must generally know what he is looking 
for. Now, to be sure, our discussion of the historicist fallacy has suggested 
that historians have certain presuppositions and assumptions.  Everyone 
does. 
Our inquiry is whether historians can be sufficiently careful to avoid 
coloring their investigations with these presuppositions and assumptions. 
We thus begin with the more specific fallacy describing the ways in which 
originalist historians too often approach questions with the end in mind—a 
habit for highly effective people, perhaps, but also for highly ineffective 
historians. 
 
38. These early cases did not liquidate the meaning in favor of McConnell’s view.  See 
McConnell, supra note 31, at 1503-11.  The cases opposed to exemptions often contain language 
suggesting that exemptions might be available in other contexts, but ultimately only one early case 
definitively found a right to an exemption and at least one found definitively the other way.  Id. at 
1513.  
39. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 547 
(2003). 
40. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 3.  
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A. FALLACY OF DECLARATIVE QUESTIONS 
The fallacy of declarative questions is a fallacy of question-framing 
whereby an historian with a presupposition will prove what he sets out to 
prove: 
The fallacy of declarative questions consists in confusing an 
interrogative with a declarative statement.  It violates a 
fundamental rule of empirical question-framing, which requires 
that a question must have an open end, which will allow a free and 
honest choice, with minimal bias and maximal flexibility.  If a 
historian goes to his sources with a simple affirmative proposition 
that “X was the case,” then he is predisposed to prove it.41 
In originalist histories this fallacy is likely committed subconsciously. 
It is particularly common in works that attempt to justify a particular 
constitutional interpretation with an appeal to the historical, general, 
original understanding of the Constitution.  Instead of approaching the 
question afresh, many constitutional theorists end up supporting their 
particular political views.  In particular and more subtly, many theorists 
tend to support a particular notion of constitutional legitimacy and then 
claim that the original meaning happily comports with their particular 
notions of legitimacy.42  That’s not to say these legal historians must be 
wrong, only that it raises the question of whether their research questions 
were properly framed.43 
This fallacy was likely committed in Randy Barnett’s Restoring the 
Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty.44  His research question is 
spelled out early, and it takes something like the following form: The 
Constitution must protect natural rights to be legitimate.  We must therefore 
look to the original Constitution and see if it protects natural rights.  He 
then looks and discovers that the original Constitution, when properly 
understood, does protect natural rights.45  Barnett does not, at least 
 
41. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 24.  
42. I have discussed this elsewhere.  See Ilan Wurman, The Original Understanding of 
Constitutional Legitimacy, 2014 BYU L. REV 819, 819-48 (2014).  
43. H. Jefferson Powell also recognized a fallacy of this kind.  H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for 
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 677 (1987) (“If the founders, as you understand them, always 
agree with you, it is logically possible that you are in incredible harmony with them.  It is 
considerably more likely that your reconstruction of their views is being systematically warped by 
your personal opinions on constitutional construction.”). 
44. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004). 
45.  More specifically, Barnett argues that a constitution may legitimately bind non-
consenting residents only if their natural rights are protected.  Id. at 4 (“I contend that if a 
constitution contains adequate procedures to protect these natural rights, it can be legitimate even 
if it was not consented to by everyone; and one that lacks adequate procedures to protect natural 
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consciously, impose the presumption of liberty on the text in order to make 
the Constitution more just; it just so happens that these constitutional 
clauses, when given this correct original meaning, are also just, and so the 
Constitution is also legitimate and worthy of our obedience.  He may be 
correct, but readers of history must surely approach such a claim with some 
skepticism. 
I think a fallacy of this sort also has occurred in the writing of Jack 
Balkin.  For him, the Constitution can only be legitimate if it allows for 
updating constitutional constructions in our time.46  Balkin further claims 
that the Framers intended for us continually to change how we interpret the 
standards and principles in the text of the Constitution.47  Of course, such a 
view runs directly contrary to Barnett’s thesis that the Constitution was 
meant primarily to protect individuals from future decision-making by 
enshrining their rights—and thus a presumption of liberty—into the 
constitutional text. Balkin draws the precise opposite conclusion than does 
Barnett from the open-endedness of the Constitution’s grand rights 
provisions with respect to the correct constitutional hermeneutic. But both 
share at least one thing in common: they begin with a notion of what the 
Constitution must say if it is to be legitimate (from their respective points of 
view), and they go on to “prove” that the Constitution says precisely that. 
Neither began his project with a truly open-ended research question. 
B. FALLACY OF FALSE DICHOTOMOUS QUESTIONS (THE EXCLUDED 
MIDDLE) 
Another specific way in which a historian might not ask the right 
question is if he asks a falsely dichotomous one. Fischer singles out this 
fallacy for “special condemnation” because it “arises from the abuse of an 
exceedingly dangerous conceptual device.”48  Properly understood, a 
dichotomy is a division into two parts that are mutually exclusive and 
 
rights is illegitimate even if it was consented to by a majority.”).  Barnett then argues that if the 
text of the various constitutional provisions is properly understood, it points to interpretations that 
may be described as a presumption of liberty.  His clearest statement that he is deriving this 
presumption from the original meaning comes on page 152, where he writes, “The original 
meaning of these nearly lost clauses [—Necessary & Proper, Privileges or Immunities, and the 
Ninth Amendment—] argues strongly against a presumption of constitutionality and in favor of 
the contrary construction I describe in chapter 10: the Presumption of Liberty.”  Id. at 152. This 
presumption also best protects the people’s natural rights by putting the burden on the government 
to justify that every action it takes is both “necessary and proper.”  Id. at 260. 
46. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4, 55, 69-73 (2011). 
47. Cf. id. at 25 (“This choice of [vague and abstract] language [of principles] makes little 
sense if the purpose of constitutionalism is to strongly constrain future decisionmaking.”); see also 
id. at 29 (“[Open-ended rights guarantees] are designed to channel and discipline future political 
judgment, not forestall it.”).  See generally id. at 21-34. 
48. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 9.  
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collectively exhaustive.  A dichotomy “is used incorrectly when a question 
is constructed so that it demands a choice between two answers which are 
in fact not exclusive or not exhaustive.”49  Nevertheless, says Fischer, 
historians often misuse dichotomy. He collects titles from actual (!) 
historical works, such as Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat? and Renaissance 
Man—Medieval or Modern? along with about two dozen others.50  Perhaps 
Plato was somewhat totalitarian and somewhat a democrat.  Or perhaps he 
was something altogether different; after all, describing him in these terms 
is to commit an anachronism, another fallacy to which we come later.  But 
surely Plato was not solely either a totalitarian or a democrat. 
Restoring the Lost Constitution likely commits this fallacy as well.  In 
making the case for a presumption of liberty, the author describes the battle 
over constitutional interpretation as a battle between the presumption of 
liberty and its nemesis, the presumption of constitutionality.51  Now of 
course many others fall into this trap, too. Indeed, Fischer explains that 
many of the examples he cites “reflect a false dichotomy which is deeply 
embedded in scholarly literature on the subject at hand.”52  But deeply 
embedded or not, why must either be the case?  That is, why must the 
Constitution either enshrine a presumption of liberty or a presumption of 
constitutionality?  Casting it as either one or the other ignores the 
possibility that it may be a little of both, or perhaps sometimes one and 
sometimes the other, or that maybe these presumptions can be avoided 
altogether, or that they are altogether meaningless.53 
Judicial opinions are replete with such questions or a least with 
statements that describe false dichotomies.  Often these will take the form 
of erroneous “if-then” propositions or “either-or” propositions; in this form 
 
49. Id. at 10.  
50. Id. at 10-11.  
51. BARNETT, supra note 44, at 5 (“Finally, I shall show how, when the meaning of these 
missing provisions is correctly understood, we can choose properly between two opposing 
constructions of the powers the Constitution delegates to government officials: . . . The first of 
these is called ‘the presumption of constitutionality.’ . . . The second of these may be called the 
Presumption of Liberty. . . .”).  
52. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 11. 
53. For example, as I have written elsewhere, the Founders understood constitutional 
legitimacy in such a way that suggests they made compromises among the ends of government, 
and therefore it may be difficult to discern which presumption is more consonant with original 
meaning.  See Wurman, supra note 42, at 848-49, 864-65.  McGinnis and Rappaport claim that by 
using original interpretive conventions we can avoid using any sort of presumption in 
constitutional construction.  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods 
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 751 (2009).  
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the fallacy is often called the fallacy of the excluded middle.54  The dissent 
in Alden v. Maine55 seems to have committed this error numerous times. 
The majority argued that Chisolm v. Georgia,56 the ruling of which was 
overturned by the Eleventh Amendment, was wrong, and therefore the 
principles of sovereign immunity extend beyond the diversity cases 
described in the Eleventh Amendment.57  The dissent responded, “[I]f the 
Court’s current reasoning is correct, the Eleventh Amendment itself was 
unnecessary.”58  That statement excludes several middles. As the majority 
itself explained, the Amendment was at least necessary to overrule 
Chisolm.59  Caleb Nelson has further explained that the Eleventh 
Amendment would have allowed dismissal of suits pending against any 
state that may have already been compelled to appear and also protected 
states that waived sovereign immunity in their own courts from having to 
appear in federal court on the basis of removal jurisdiction.60 
The dissent again committed the fallacy of false dichotomous questions 
when it set up its inquiry by seeking to determine whether sovereign 
immunity was, at the time of the founding, considered: (1) a common law 
power understood to be defeasible by statute or (2) whether it was 
considered a natural law concept whereby a sovereign could not be 
logically bound to the law it made.61  It turns out that neither of these two 
conceptions was likely how the founders viewed sovereign immunity.  
Caleb Nelson again shows that sovereign immunity was not a natural law 
doctrine or a common law power defeasible by statute, but rather it was 
more likely a doctrine of personal jurisdiction whereby a sovereign could 
not be sued because there was no way to compel the sovereign’s attendance 
by civil process—and therefore courts would not have the power to enter a 
judgment because no “case” or “controversy” would have formed.62  The 
lesson of all of these examples is that it is very difficult to obtain correct 
historical answers when the initial question being answered is flawed by its 
exclusion ab initio of plausible routes of inquiry. 
 
54. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to 
Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 367 (1994); William Ewald, Unger’s Philosophy: A Critical 
Legal Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665, 756 n.117 (1988).  
55. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).  
56. 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
57. Alden, 527 U.S. at 721-22.  
58. Id. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. at 723. 
60. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 1559, 1603-06 (2002).  
61. Alden, 527 U.S. at 762-64 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
62. Nelson, supra note 60, at 1567-1608.  
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We must conclude this particular discussion with an example from an 
amicus brief before the Supreme Court in the Second Amendment case, 
District of Columbia v. Heller.63  The brief was written by a group of 
professional historians—all of whom “earned Ph.D. degrees in history, 
hold academic appointments in university departments of history, and 
specialize in the American Revolution, the Early Republic, American Legal 
History, American Constitutional History, Anglo-American Legal History, 
or related areas.”64  They drew attention to historians’ recurring complaint 
about the shortcomings of “law office history.”65  And they, incredibly, 
committed at least one major fallacy of question-framing, as well as a 
handful of other fallacies that we shall encounter in the coming Parts. 
The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”66  Our professional historians frame the 
question as follows: 
As a problem for constitutional historians, the question can be 
elaborated and restated this way: Did the framers and ratifiers of 
the Amendment believe they were constitutionally entrenching an 
individual right to keep arms for personal protection?  Or did they 
conceive the Amendment to achieve a different end, by affirming 
that a “well-regulated militia” of citizen-soldiers would preserve 
“the security of a free state,” principally by lessening the need for 
a republican government to depend on a standing army?67 
The Second Amendment, however, makes reference both to a right of 
the people to bear arms and to a well-regulated militia.  By improperly 
framing the question as a false dichotomy, these professional historians ab 
initio missed the possibility—and therefore the evidence they sought 
naturally led them away from that possibility—that a well-regulated militia 
was to be maintained by protecting the people’s right to remain armed and 
trained.  That, indeed, appears to be the conclusion adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Heller.68 
It is important to emphasize that the above is not to say that this third 
view is correct, but it is to say that it’s possible that it is correct.  By 
 
63. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
64. Brief of Jack N. Rakove et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, District of 
Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290 (Jan. 11, 2008), 2008 WL 157183, at 1 [hereinafter Brief of 
Rakove et al.].  
65. Id. at 33. 
66. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
67. Brief of Rakove et al., supra note 64, at 1-2.  
68. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599-600 (2008). 
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improperly framing the question, however, the professional historians 
closed themselves off to its possibility.  Law-office historians, it would 
seem, do no worse than their colleagues on the opposite side of their 
university campuses. 
C. FALLACY OF QUIBBLING 
The fallacy of quibbling is listed in Fischer’s book under the category 
“fallacies of semantical distortion”69 but fits here as well.  It is “a form of 
equivocation which involves two or more people in a single argumentative 
exchange”; “[i]t occurs whenever the meaning of a term is changed as it 
changes hands, with a resultant argumentative distortion.”70  For example, 
Fischer explains how Max Weber’s famous thesis of “a functional 
relationship between capitalism and the Protestant ethic rested upon a 
careful definition of these terms”; an opponent, however, “subtly shifted 
those definitions in his attempt at refutation.”71  This is a question-framing 
problem because it distorts the components of a prior scholar’s question. 
At a high level of generality, this fallacy occurs in the debates over 
originalism, when the opponents of it distort the thought of originalists in 
order to refute them.  This occurs in Stephen M. Griffin’s Rebooting 
Originalism, where he argues that originalism depends on a view of history 
devoid of historical context.72  No originalist believes, however, that history 
can be done without taking historical context into account. Indeed, that is 
the only way to do history.  Originalists do, as we shall see later, often 
commit errors with their evidence, but that is not because they maintain that 
historical context is irrelevant. 
Similarly, to claim in 2007 that originalism fails because the Founders 
did not adhere to the “plain meaning” of legal texts73 is to commit the 
fallacy of quibbling because: (1) no originalist seriously believes that legal 
texts must be interpreted by their “plain” rather than their “reasonable” or 
“contextual” meaning,74 and (2) to understand the “plain” meaning of words 
 
69. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 275. 
70. Id. 
71. Id.  
72. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (2008). 
73. See Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian 
Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 150 (2007). 
74. This includes the originalist, Randy Barnett, on whose definition Cornell relied. Id. 
Barnett defines originalism as seeking to discover the “objective original meaning that a 
reasonable listener would have placed on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time 
of its enactment.”  Id. at 150 (quoting Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 
LOY. L. REV. 611, 620, 621 (1999)).  An “objective” meaning to a “reasonable” observer may not 
be, and probably would not be, the “plain meaning” devoid of any legal background or linguistic 
context.  
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one often has to look at context—claiming otherwise would be 
preposterous.  In other words, the author who claims “there is good reason 
to doubt that plain-meaning originalism is a historically accurate reflection 
of how many contemporaries would have interpreted the Constitution” 
because those contemporaries had a “deeply contextualist … approach” to 
constitutionalism,75 commits the fallacy of quibbling both by redefining 
originalism and by redefining plain meaning. 
Changing the terms to defeat an opponent is generally a common 
practice, not just in historical arguments; but the latter of our two examples 
is also important for a crucial historical inquiry.  If in seeking to discover 
whether the Founders were originalists—and therefore whether or not 
originalism is a self-defeating proposition—we change the definition of 
“originalism,” our historical analysis will be of doubtful utility.  As Fischer 
observes, the historian will have disproved a thesis—in our case, that the 
Founders were plain-meaning interpreters of legal texts—but not the thesis 
he claims to have disproved.76 
IV. FALLACIES OF FACTUAL VERIFICATION 
Fallacies of factual verification involve the types of evidence historians 
use to try to prove the truthfulness of a fact.  Sometimes the evidence does 
not actually prove what the historian seeks to prove.  This error occurs in 
certain patterns that can be described as fallacies, of which this part 
analyzes only a few.  The most common one in the originalist literature is 
the fallacy of negative proof—the notion that an absence of evidence of 
something is itself affirmative evidence that something did not or could not 
exist. 
A. FALLACY OF NEGATIVE PROOF 
“The fallacy of negative proof is an attempt to sustain a factual 
proposition merely by negative evidence.  It occurs whenever a historian 
declares that ‘there is no evidence that X is the case,’ and then proceeds to 
affirm or assume that not-X is the case.”77  H. Jefferson Powell warned of 
something similar when he instructed originalists not to use “silence” as 
evidence of historical understanding,78 though using silence as evidence 
may not always commit the fallacy of negative proof.79 
 
75. Id. at 151. 
76. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 275.  
77. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 47. 
78. Powell, supra note 43, at 671-72. 
79. If, for example, a particular power were an attractive power, an absence of any use of 
that power might suggest that it did not exist.  The problem, however, is usually in the premise—
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Notwithstanding Powell’s early admonition, the fallacy of negative 
proof has been committed in a number of important contexts, the anti-
commandeering literature and judicial opinions being of particular note.  In 
Printz v. United States,80 this fallacy rears its head several times.  Justice 
Scalia writes for the Court that contemporaneous legislative exposition of 
the Constitution is strong affirmative evidence of the original meaning of 
the constitutional text.81  He then writes: “Indeed, it can be argued that the 
numerousness of these statutes [imposing obligations on state courts], 
contrasted with the utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’ 
executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), 
suggests an assumed absence of such power.”82  That statement commits 
the fallacy of negative proof.  Use of a power is evidence of the existence of 
that power; claiming that there is no evidence of use is tantamount to 
claiming that there is no evidence of the power.  The Court’s proposition 
thus takes the form “there is no evidence of X, therefore not-X must be the 
case.”  The Court repeats this same proposition at other points in the 
opinion.83 
Justice Scalia’s reliance on an absence of evidence, to be sure, is not a 
perfect example of the fallacy of negative proof because it does provide us 
with some important evidence.  Specifically, Justice Scalia explains that if 
the power did exist, it would have been an attractive power to use and 
therefore we might suppose that it would have been used.84  We shall see 
shortly that this assumption was likely wrong and there is another 
explanation for why the federal government may not have used this power. 
But we should note that if the assumption is correct, then demonstrating an 
absence of evidence would be some proof that the power did not exist. 
Both the majority and the dissent commit a more complete version of 
this fallacy when they make too much of the circumstances surrounding 
President Wilson’s “requesting” rather than demanding the states’ aid in 
implementing the draft.  The majority takes Wilson’s posture to mean that 
 
thinking that something would have been an attractive power, or that something would have been 
said if people thought it, and so on.  Those are often faulty assumptions, which goes to show the 
danger of silence generally, even if using silence as evidence is not always negative proof.  See 
infra pp. 181-83 (discussing the anti-commandeering opinions).  
80. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
81. Id. at 905. 
82. Id. at 907-08 (emphasis removed). 
83. Id. at 916 (“To complete the historical record, we must note that there is not only an 
absence of executive-commandeering statutes in the early Congresses, but there is an absence of 
them in our later history as well . . . .”).  
84. “Conversely if . . . earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power [of the 
commandeering of state officers to enforce federal laws], we would have reason to believe that the 
power was thought not to exist.”  Id. at 905.  
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he believed it necessary to request rather than to commandeer the state 
officers, evidence that commandeering is unconstitutional.85  But there 
could be any number of political reasons to request rather than to 
commandeer.  The absence of the power’s use does not mean the power did 
not exist.  The dissent, for its part, writes: “If there were merit to the 
Court’s appraisal of this incident, one would assume that there would have 
been some contemporary comment on the supposed constitutional concern 
that hypothetically might have motivated the President’s choice of 
language.”86  That there was no evidence of Wilson having been concerned 
about the constitutionality of commandeering does not mean that Wilson 
was not concerned about the constitutionality of commandeering.  To say 
otherwise is to commit the fallacy of negative proof.  It cannot be stressed 
enough how common this faulty mode of reasoning has become in judicial 
opinions.  It has become almost second nature. 
One anti-commandeering scholar committed this same fallacy when, 
discussing the commandeering of state courts, he wrote: “[G]iven that the 
Anti-Federalists’ real and imagined fears for the loss of state autonomy 
were easily aroused, the absence of any outcry from them concerning the 
prospect of jurisdictional (or other) coercion, is itself strong evidence that 
such a prospect was not part of the perceived message of The Federalist.”87 
In other words, there is no evidence of X (the existence of the power would 
be evinced by an outcry against it), and therefore not-X (the power does not 
exist). 
But there might be another explanation for both the absence of the 
outcry and the absence of any historical use.  First, suppose there was no 
outcry because the Anti-Federalists wanted the federal government to 
commandeer state officials because they feared a federal bureaucracy above 
all.  Second, suppose that the Federalists reassured the Anti-Federalists that 
the federal government would use state officials to execute federal laws to 
assuage their concerns.  But then suppose the Federalists took power early 
in the republic and decided to create a federal bureaucracy after all in a kind 
of bait-and-switch.  There would be no evidence of early historical use 
because the Federalists did not want to use the state officials when it could 
create a federal bureaucracy, whose officers would have federal 
attachments, instead. That, indeed, is the narrative put forward by Wesley J. 
Campbell in his Yale Law Journal article, Commandeering and 
 
85. Id. at 917.  
86. Id. at 953 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
87. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian 
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 142.  
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Constitutional Change.88  Although his evidence is not unequivocal, it is 
strikingly persuasive.89 
Having assailed significant portions of the conservative Justices’ 
historical analysis in Printz, the liberal Justices’ historical analysis in 
another federalism context—sovereign immunity—must be challenged as 
well.  We need only revisit Alden v. Maine, where the dissenters committed 
the fallacy of negative proof repeatedly.  The dissenters at one point write, 
“There is no evidence . . . that any concept of inherent sovereign immunity 
was understood historically to apply when the sovereign sued was not the 
font of the law.”90  Elsewhere the dissenters point to the “fact” that “no 
State declared that sovereign immunity” was an “inalienable and natural 
right[]” as evidence that sovereign immunity was not so considered.91  As 
we have discussed earlier, however, Caleb Nelson offers a treasure trove of 
affirmative evidence demonstrating that the founding generation 
overwhelmingly considered sovereign immunity to be a doctrine of 
personal jurisdiction—which would make irrelevant which sovereign was 
the font of the law.92 
Negative proof is not constrained to federalism decisions. Campbell 
again shows how Justice Scalia’s concluding statement in his City of 
Boerne93 concurrence, again on the free exercise issue, commits this fallacy. 
Scalia had written: 
 
88. Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104 
(2013).  
89. Campbell’s discussion of the impost debates proves that the anti-federalists would have 
preferred that state officers execute federal laws, but it does not prove that the Constitution 
permitted commandeering of state officials without state consent.  See id. at 1112-26.  In the 
ratification debates, Hamilton tried to assuage the anti-federalists by claiming the federal 
government would “make use of” or would “employ” state officials to execute federal law.   Id. at 
1129-30.  It still does not follow that the Constitution permitted commandeering. Campbell makes 
the strongest case from this part of the evidence as follows: “During the impost controversy, 
defenders of state autonomy had insisted that hiring federal collectors posed a greater threat to 
state sovereignty than commandeering state collectors.  With the impost controversy coloring the 
entire debate, it was unnecessary for Federalists to explain that state officers would be compelled 
to enforce federal law.  And surely contemporaries would not have thought that Federalist silence 
signaled a tacit denial of federal commandeering power.”  Id. at 1132-33.  
 Campbell offers more direct evidence that a federal commandeering power was contemplated 
in his discussion of the Oath Clause, which, he argues, was understood to imply that state officers 
would have to enforce federal laws, id. at 1134-35, and of the debate over posse comitatus, in 
which the Federalists suggested that the greater power to call forth the state militias included the 
lesser powers to call upon the civil authority—the county sheriff and his posse of local citizens—
to enforce the federal laws, id. at 1140-41.  For his discussion of the Federalist bait-and-switch 
and the Anti-Federalists’ political blunders that contributed to it, see id. at 1144-48, 1153-57, 
1166. 
90. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
91. Id. at 772.  
92. Nelson, supra note 60, at 1567-1608.  
93. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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It seems to me that the most telling point made by the dissent is to 
be found, not in what it says, but in what it fails to say.  Had the 
understanding in the period surrounding the ratification of the Bill 
of Rights been that the various forms of accommodation discussed 
by the dissent were constitutionally required (either by State 
Constitutions or by the Federal Constitution), it would be 
surprising not to find a single state or federal case refusing to 
enforce a generally applicable statute because of its failure to make 
accommodation.  Yet the dissent cites none—and to my 
knowledge, and to the knowledge of the academic defenders of the 
dissent’s position, none exists.94 
But Campbell shows that the dearth of cases is explained far more by a 
skepticism toward claims of religious belief in the first place (and hence 
there would be no need for any accommodation), rather than a view that 
there should be no such accommodations for genuinely religious beliefs.95 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the 
Noel Canning v. NLRB96 decision also relied (though only partly) on the 
absence of historical practice in deciding whether the President could fill a 
vacancy during an intra-session recess rather than “the Recess” in between 
official sessions of the Senate (known as the inter-session recess).  The 
court emphasized the importance of early congressional practice: “The 
interpretation of the [Recess Appointments] Clause in the years 
immediately following the Constitution’s ratification is the most instructive 
historical analysis in discerning the original meaning.”97  The court then 
noted that there was a striking absence of appointments during intra-session 
recesses.98  The problem, however, is that intra-session recesses of the kind 
that occur today were extremely rare in the early republic.  As the court 
recognized, “it is true that intrasession recesses of significant length may 
have been far less common in those early days than today.”99  Yet the court 
nonetheless proceeded to declare that it is still “the case that the 
appointment practices of Presidents more nearly contemporaneous with the 
 
94. Id. at 542. 
95. Wesley J. Campbell, Note, A New Approach to Nineteenth-Century Religious Exemption 
Cases, 63 STAN. L. REV. 973, 976 (2011). 
96. Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 
(U.S. 2013).  
97. Id. at 501.  
98. Id. (“The available evidence shows that no President attempted to make an intrasession 
recess appointment for 80 years after the Constitution was ratified.”).  
99. Id. at 502. 
         
2015] LAW HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES 185 
adoption of the Constitution do not support the propriety of intrasession 
recess appointments.”100 
This conclusion does not seem correct.  The historical evidence may 
tell us nothing at all one way or the other; but it surely does not tell us that 
an act undertaken in a given condition is unconstitutional because it was not 
exercised under that condition in early congressional history, if that 
condition simply did not exist in that early history.  To be sure, if the 
historical evidence demonstrated that there were an equal number of 
intrasession recesses and intersession recesses but that recess appointments 
only occurred during the latter, that would be much stronger evidence that 
the power was thought not to exist.  It would still be negative proof and we 
would have to be careful in using it—but it would be better negative proof 
than that used by the Noel Canning court. 
Fortunately, the Noel Canning decision also points to the kind of 
affirmative historical evidence that lawyers and historians can and should 
use.  The court astutely noted that President George Washington seemed to 
understand the clause to require that the vacancy itself arise during a recess: 
If not enough time remained in the session to ask a person to serve 
in an office, President Washington would nominate a person 
without the nominee’s consent, and the Senate would confirm the 
individual before recessing.  Then, if the person declined to serve 
during the recess, thereby creating a new vacancy during the 
recess, President Washington would fill the position using his 
recess appointment power.101 
The court provided additional historical evidence from the writings of 
Edmund Randolph and Alexander Hamilton.102  It might be objected that 
this affirmative evidence is just the other side of the same coin: There was 
no evidence that George Washington did X (because he in fact did Y), and 
therefore not-X.  But that is not quite the same thing.  The evidence that 
Washington did Y suggests that he thought Y was the case, providing us 
with affirmative proof that Y perhaps was the case. 
We might illustrate with another example of affirmative historical 
evidence.  Robert Natelson has quite exhaustively looked at uses of the term 
“the Recess” in founding-era writings and concludes that the term always 
referred to the gap between formal sessions of the legislature, although the 
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word recess could itself refer to any time the legislature was not sitting.103 
His evidence demonstrates that the words most likely would not have 
allowed the President to make appointments without the advice and consent 
of the Senate if the Senate was not in an actual, intersession Recess.  This is 
evidence that Y is the case, i.e., that the word was used in some particular 
way, which is not the same thing as saying the word was not used in some 
other way and therefore that other way is not the case. 
The fallacy of negative proof does not occur only in judicial opinions. 
Our previously introduced group of professional historians commit this 
fallacy in the amicus brief they wrote for the Supreme Court’s consideration 
in D.C. v. Heller.  They argued that “[e]xplicit Anti-Federalist references to 
a private right to arms were conspicuously few in number and failed to 
generate political support” was evidence that an individual right to bear 
arms did not exist.104  They emphasize this negative proof repeatedly in 
their brief.105  The irony serves to remind us that all historians, whether 
lawyers-turned-historians or professional historians, are prone to commit 
methodological errors. 
In the above example, the negative proof may seem powerful 
juxtaposed with the affirmative proof that the populace at the time spoke 
commonly of the right in the context of militias.  But that does not make the 
negative proof anymore real proof.  It could easily be the case—and the 
professional historians’ own primary sources seem to suggest as much—
that many if not most individuals owned arms for self-defense and 
recreational activities and saw no need to state an uncontroversial 
proposition.  As the historians themselves write, gun “ownership and use 
were not major issues in eighteenth-century America.”106  Ironically, the 
authors rely on a sarcastic statement by Noah Webster in response to Anti-
Federalist requests that a private right to bear arms be protected.  He had 
asked why not add to the proposed prohibition on infringing the right to 
bear arms the following: “That Congress shall never restrain any inhabitant 
of America from eating and drinking, at seasonable times, or prevent his 
 
103. Robert G. Natelson, The Origins and Meaning of “Vacancies that May Happen During 
the Recess” in the Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 
213-27.  It should be noted that the majority in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, 
134 S.Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014), stated that the word “recess” was ambiguous but relied on dictionary 
definitions and other usages, not on its use with respect to parliamentary procedure.  
104. Brief of Rakove et al., supra note 64, at 22.  
105. Id. at 10 & n.2 (“It is noteworthy that no [early state rights declarations] made any 
reference to the private ownership and personal use of firearms.”); id. at 17 (“Lee identified a 
number of fundamental rights deserving recognition, but said nothing about firearms.”); id. at 22 
(“In contrast to the numerous discussions of the militia during the ratification debates, explicit 
references to the private ownership of firearms were few and scattered.”). 
106. Id. at 12.   
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lying on his left side, in a long winter’s night, or even on his back, when he 
is fatigued by lying on his right.”107  But this shows just how ludicrous was 
the idea that the government would ever infringe on the people’s rights to 
bear arms, which is why there was only limited discussion of the issue.  
That the discussion was limited therefore gives us very little indication of 
whether this right was ultimately protected by the text of the Amendment. 
B. FALLACY OF REVERSIBLE REFERENCE 
Fischer defines reversible reference as “a chameleonlike statement 
which changes its color with its context and which might variously be used 
to prove the proposition that X is the case or that not-X is the case, as the 
author wishes.”108  It is the use of evidence to prove a proposition when 
precisely the opposite proposition might also adequately explain the same 
evidence.  Fischer provides a rather humorous example from Carl 
Bridenbaugh’s book Cities in the Wilderness. 
To support the proposition that “[c]asting rubbish and refuse of all 
kinds into the streets without let or hindrance was a confirmed habit of both 
English and American town-dwellers”—that is, that colonial towns were 
filthy and strewn with trash—Bridenbaugh offered three pieces of 
evidence.109  They were: “that a law was passed against littering in New 
Amsterdam in 1657, that the law was enforced upon an early American 
litterbug named John Sharp in 1671, and that provision was made in 1670 
for weekly trash removal by the car men of the city.”110  We immediately 
see the problem.  Each of these pieces of evidence can be consistent with 
either the proposition that colonial American streets were strewn with trash 
or the opposite proposition—that colonial American streets were kept clean 
due precisely to these laws and regulations.111  Fischer points out, 
importantly, that the evidence can also be consistent with any position 
between these two opposites.112 
There are many straightforward examples of this fallacy.  We must 
harp once more on the dissenting opinion in Alden v. Maine.  At one point, 
the dissent offers evidence that “[s]everal colonial charters . . . expressly 
specified that the corporate body established thereunder could sue and be 
sued” for the proposition that “[t]he American Colonies did not enjoy 
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sovereign immunity.”113  Yet this is a reversible reference; it is literally 
meaningless.  It can stand for the stated proposition, or it can stand for 
precisely the opposite proposition that the American Colonies did enjoy 
sovereign immunity which is why some colonies had to abrogate sovereign 
immunity or expressly consent to suit in their charters. 
Our professional historians’ use of the fallacy of negative proof also 
seems to commit the fallacy of the reversible reference.  To recapitulate, 
these historians argued from the fact that “references to the keeping of 
firearms are so few and terse” that the individual’s right to bear arms was a 
“minor . . . question,” and therefore that the Second Amendment’s 
preamble, which has to do with the hotly debated issue of militias, is the 
“true guide to its original meaning.”114  Yet this absence of historical 
evidence can also be proof of precisely the opposite proposition: that the 
individual’s right to bear arms was unflinchingly accepted and 
uncontroversial (recall Noah Webster’s sarcasm to this effect), and 
therefore it is unremarkable that the Framers of the Second Amendment 
protected this individual right. 
Finally, we can point to an instance in the debate between Michael 
McConnell and Philip Hamburger over the meaning of the Free Exercise 
Clause in which this fallacy was perhaps just barely averted.115  McConnell 
relies at one point on James Madison’s insistence on including a religious 
exemption to the militia clause in the Federal Constitution as evidence “that 
Madison believed freedom of religion to include exemption from generally 
applicable laws in some circumstances.”116  As Philip Hamburger criticized, 
however, “Yet other conclusions at least as probable as McConnell’s can be 
drawn from Madison’s proposal of a military exemption: For example, 
Madison may have assumed that a conscience or free exercise clause would 
not provide any right of exemption.”117  After all, if the Free Exercise 
Clause already provided such exemptions as McConnell would like for us 
to believe, why would Madison need to include one in the militia clause? 
One does not commit a fallacy of reversible reference if one 
acknowledges that a contrary interpretation is possible and attempts to 
support one particular interpretation with good arguments.  McConnell 
averts committing the fallacy because he examines the debates in more 
depth and offers reasons why Madison’s position may still have been 
 
113. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 764 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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consistent with a general exemption in the Free Exercise Clause.118  For 
example, the Free Exercise Clause applies to the federal government, but 
the militias are controlled by the states; or perhaps the Framers intended 
more firmly to ensure exemptions in military matters; or perhaps they 
worried that leaving out an exemption would be construed as evidence that 
no exemptions for free exercise were ever contemplated.119 
Explaining, as McConnell does, why an alternative explanation for the 
evidence can be rejected is absolutely necessary for avoiding the fallacy of 
reversible reference.  McConnell narrowed his claim in his first reference to 
the militia clause debate by stating that it will reveal that Madison believed 
in exemptions “in some circumstances.”120  He must temper his ultimate 
claim as well, and he thus concludes that the exemption discussion in the 
militia clause debates “strongly suggests that the general idea of free 
exercise exemptions was part of the legal culture.”121 
V. FALLACIES OF FACTUAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Generally, fallacies of factual significance are errors in the selection of 
facts important to a particular question.122  For example, Fischer describes 
the “prodigious fallacy” as “mistak[ing] sensation for significance”; it is the 
erroneous idea that historians must describe the rare and spectacular rather 
than the mundane and common.123  If one agrees that what he describes is 
indeed a fallacy (I’m not convinced that it always must be), then it is a 
fallacy of factual significance because it suggests that historians are 
drawing conclusions from insignificant evidence.  What I call the 
originalist’s fallacy would fall under Fischer’s larger category of fallacies of 
factual significance.124 
The originalist’s fallacy is the notion that we must look only to 
evidence from before the enactment of a constitutional provision to 
understand its meaning.  Professors Calabresi and Prakash adhere to a 
version of this idea: “[E]ven after having demonstrated a textual 
ambiguity,” they write, “no originalist should rely exclusively upon the 
Constitution’s postenactment ‘legislative’ history, which is, after all, the 
history that is least likely to reflect the original understanding.  It is better to 
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123. Id. at 70-71.  
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examine exhaustively the pre-ratification material first and only look at the 
post-ratification material if it is absolutely necessary to do so.”125  (When 
understood against the article to which they were responding, as I shall 
explain shortly, I think their view may not ultimately be inconsistent with 
the view I espouse here.126)  Another scholar has written, “[A]s a 
methodological matter, it seems somewhat strange for originalists to prefer 
post-ratification materials with concrete implications for winners and losers 
over pre-ratification materials.”127  This notion seems to follow naturally 
from the idea that the text’s meaning is “fixed” at the time of enactment.128 
Philip Hamburger may have adhered to this view in his response to 
Michael McConnell on free exercise when Hamburger ignored the evidence 
from the earliest judicial opinions. “Although interesting,” writes 
Hamburger, the evidence from nineteenth-century judicial opinions is “only 
indirectly pertinent to the question of what late eighteenth-century 
Americans thought about exemptions.”129  Hamburger focuses on pre-
enactment evidence.  
McConnell, however, surveyed state cases from as early as 1813.130  It 
is of course possible (and maybe even probable) that the court did not 
understand the free exercise of religion in the state constitution as the 
framers of the New York constitution would have understood it thirty-five 
years earlier,131 but as the first case interpreting it and only a generation 
removed from the framing surely this evidence is worth some, if not 
significant, weight. If the evidence from the eighteenth-century was 
overwhelmingly contrary, then perhaps these early cases can be dismissed; 
but if the evidence is not overwhelmingly to the contrary, surely the post-
enactment nature of the judicial opinions—which will always be post-
enactment—does not inherently undermine its worth.132 
 
125. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550-51 (1994).  
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34, at 924. 
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the framings.  McConnell, supra note 31, at 1513 (“None of these decisions was handed down 
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One more recent and explicit example of this fallacy appears in an 
article on the Recess Appointments Clause.133  The author writes, 
The disadvantages of omitting preratification material should be 
obvious.  Statements and practices arising after the ratification 
may not have been part of the ratifiers’ original understanding. 
When postratification sources do shed light back into the tunnel of 
time, that light is usually weak and uncertain.  Even statements by 
people who participated in the constitutional debates, such as 
Edmund Randolph, Alexander Hamilton, and Christopher Gore, 
are of limited value if made after the Constitution was already law. 
Memories fade and incentives change.  Thus, the best evidence of 
the original force of the unamended Constitution comes from 
sources arising before the thirteenth state, Rhode Island, ratified 
the document on May 29, 1790.134 
But why?  It is not at all obvious that pre-enactment evidence is any 
better than post-enactment evidence.  If one source expounding on the 
meaning of a constitutional provision is dated May 28, 1790, is it really of 
more force than a different source dated May 30, 1790, expounding on the 
same provision?  Surely not.  Perhaps an improved test, then, would be to 
use that evidence which is nearest in time to enactment whether it dates 
from before or after the event.  Indeed, that seems to be the standard that 
Fischer provides and which he calls the rule of “immediacy”: 
[A]n historian must not merely provide good relevant evidence but 
the best relevant evidence.  And the best relevant evidence, all 
things being equal, is evidence which is most nearly immediate to 
the event itself.  The very best evidence, of course, is the event 
itself, and then the authentic remains of the event, and then direct 
observations, etc.135 
Other considerations, such as motive and incentive, also come into 
play.  But although incentives surely change over time, and perhaps 
immediately post-enactment, incentives must always be taken into account 
in assessing the worth of any material, whether pre- or post-enactment. 
What the Federalists were assuring the public about the Constitution’s 
meaning before ratification ought to carry more weight than what the Anti-
Federalists were accusing it of meaning.  Although both sides may have had 
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motives to distort, the Anti-Federalists, who opposed the Constitution, had 
more motive to exaggerate.  But after ratification it may very well be that 
the motives of the Federalists changed.  Now they had their Constitution; 
perhaps all those assurances they gave did not need to be adhered to 
anymore.136 
We have already seen that something of this sort may have occurred 
with the discussions over commandeering of state officials: The Federalists 
assured the Anti-Federalists that state officers would or at least could have 
the responsibility to implement federal programs.  When the Federalists 
won the initial elections, however, they decided to create a federal 
bureaucracy to implement such programs.  The post-enactment actions of 
the Federalists may therefore carry less weight than their pre-enactment 
assurances.  Therefore, an even better test for good evidence would be 
nearest in time with least motive to distort. 
Kesavan and Paulsen offer another plausible test for the use of both 
pre-enactment and post-enactment history: “Post-Founding evidence is 
probative of original linguistic meaning and should be consulted even when 
the Founding-era evidence is seemingly unambiguous. . . . [E]vidence from 
even a lower-priority category of second-best evidence of constitutional 
meaning may reinforce (or undermine) conclusions derived from a higher-
priority category of second-best evidence of constitutional meaning.”137  In 
other words, consistent post-enactment evidence might support, amplify, 
and clarify our pre-enactment evidence. 
Just as useful, however, is post-enactment evidence that seems to offer 
another interpretation of the pre-enactment evidence.  It may lead us to 
question our interpretation of the pre-enactment evidence.  Consider 
Chisolm v. Georgia.138  Although as we have seen there was pre-ratification 
evidence that the text of Article III left sovereign immunity intact—because 
“cases” or “controversies” could not form without personal jurisdiction over 
the states139—it clearly was not obvious to everyone, including four out of 
 
136. I should like to be clear on this point.  Even if the Federalists had motive to sugarcoat 
certain aspects of the Constitution to achieve ratification, if the Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
came to agree that that sugarcoated interpretation was the one everyone was enacting, that 
interpretation is perhaps the most plausible in terms of historical understanding.  In other words, 
even if the Federalists didn’t really believe what they were saying, taking them at their word 
would have interpretive value.  In any event, the point is only that incentives to distort exist both 
before and after an event, even if the nature of the incentives—or the distortions—might change.  
137. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1182 (2003). 
138. 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
139. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.  
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five Supreme Court justices, that the Constitution left it intact.140  The 
popular reaction against Chisolm, which was decided only a few years after 
the founding, might tell us a lot about how the people understood the words 
of Article III.  It is quite plausible to argue that the uproar over Chisolm 
reflected general disagreement with its conclusion; this evidence is not 
inherently suspect merely because it arises after ratification. 
The point is that there is no necessary connection between a change in 
time and a change in motive.  Barring a persuasive explanation as to why 
the Ratification itself might have affected the public’s use of the word 
“happen,” or its understanding of “sovereign immunity,” there is no logical 
reason to give more evidentiary weight pre-1789 than to post-1789 
evidence so long as the absolute temporal distance is about the same. 
Let us conclude by revisiting what Calabresi and Prakash said.141  They 
disavowed post-enactment legislative history because they felt their 
adversaries in the debate over the unitary executive had used such history to 
create ambiguity in the text.142  Lessig and Sunstein, they argued, used the 
statutes enacted by the first Congress as evidence of how they understood 
their power to structure the executive branch; but Congress was an 
institutional rival of the President, and hence their post-enactment view of 
presidential power is unreliable.143  I think that is a fair argument to make; 
taking that into account is consistent with the rule of immediacy, modified 
by incentives to distort.  But I also think it would not be unfair to suggest 
that the First Congress, perhaps more than any other Congress since, took 
seriously the idea that it was left to them to figure out just how this new 
Constitution of theirs was to work and what it meant.  Indeed, moving 
forward a few decades, was Henry Clay’s impassioned plea for the 
independence of the Treasury Department only a function of his 
institutional interests?144  And even if it was, wasn’t Andrew Jackson’s 
contrary view145 merely a function of his institutional interests?  I think the 
matter is too complicated merely to assert that post-enactment history is the 
worst kind of evidence. 
 
140. Of course, the state of Georgia never appeared to defend, fearing that any appearance 
could be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity.  The justice therefore did not have the 
benefit of their argument. Chisolm, 2 U.S. at 419 (“And now Ingersoll, and Dallas, presented to 
the Court a written remonstrance and protestation on behalf of the State, against the exercise of 
jurisdiction in the cause; but, in consequence of positive instructions, they declined taking any part 
in arguing the question.”). 
141. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 125, at 550-51.  
142. Id. at 554-55.  
143. Id. at 549. 
144. Cass R. Sunstein & Lawrence Lessig, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 81-82 (1994). 
145. Id. at 79-81. 
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VI. FALLACIES OF NARRATION 
Narration is one of the more common forms historians use to tell 
stories.146  Although there are many elements to narration, the one involving 
the most common errors is the element of “time and temporal integrity.”147 
Most errors in legal histories similarly involve, not surprisingly, the element 
of time. 
A. FALLACY OF ANACHRONISM 
Fischer argues that the fallacy of anachronism underlies most of the 
more specific fallacies of narration.148  The fallacy consists in the 
“description, analysis, or judgment of an event as if it occurred at some 
point in time other than when it actually happened.”149  There are many 
kinds of anachronisms with which most of us should be familiar.  One 
particularly insidious kind is judging a period by an atemporal standard. 
Fischer uses an example of an historian, Leonard Levy, who had criticized 
Thomas Jefferson for being unlibertarian.150  Yet, as Fischer writes, 
Levy formed in his own mind an idea of what civil liberties should 
entail—an idea which has some relevance in some of its particulars 
to some of Jefferson’s associates . . . .  Then he proceeded to 
condemn Jefferson, sometimes explicitly, sometimes by innuendo, 
for not living up to this exalted atemporal standard.  In short, Levy 
analyzed and evaluated Jefferson by measuring his acts and 
attitudes against the standards of the ACLU and tallying all the 
discrepancies.  The result is objectionable not merely because it is 
unfair to Jefferson but also because it distorts and falsifies the 
texture of Jeffersonian thought.151 
The socialist historian E.P. Thompson alluded to a fallacy of this sort when 
he famously described the “enormous condescension of posterity.”152 
An example of the fallacy of anachronism occurs in the article State 
Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are Really Deeply 
Rooted in American History and Tradition?153  The authors seek to 
 
146. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 131. 
147. Id. at 132.  
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 132-33.  
150. Id. at 133.  
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152. EDWARD P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 12 (1963).  
153. Steven G. Calabresi et. al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual 
Rights Are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 
(2012) 
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determine which rights were “really deeply rooted” at the founding by 
exploring state bills of rights in 1787 and 1791.154  In their tables 
cataloguing a variety of rights they are investigating, they include “Blaine 
Clauses.”155  The failed federal Blaine Amendment and its successful state 
counterparts sought to bar public funds to private individuals for use at a 
religious school or organization.156  They resulted from Protestant agitation 
against private Catholic schools.157  The first state equivalent was passed in 
1854,158 and the federal Blaine Amendment was introduced in 1875 and 
narrowly defeated in 1876.159  Why would the authors even look for any 
such amendments in 1787?  Doing so is a completely a-historical and 
fruitless enterprise. 
But what the authors conclude from this exercise is not just fruitless but 
also, I think, erroneous.  They write, 
 There were some clauses bearing on religion that were 
surprisingly not present at the time of the founding.  We found no 
clauses pertaining to witness qualification on the basis of religion, 
no clauses mandating a legislative duty to protect religion, no bans 
on religious qualifications for holding office; and no Blaine 
Amendment provisions forbidding any taxpayer money from ever 
going to any institution including a school under sectarian control. 
The total absence of Blaine Amendment provisions at the founding 
is striking because it reemphasizes the extent to which those 
provisions are likely a product of nineteenth century anti-Catholic, 
anti-immigrant biases.160 
The lack of Blaine Amendments at that time surely tells us absolutely 
nothing about the causes of their passage when they actually occurred 60–
100 years later.  In itself, this tells us nothing more than does pointing out 
that there were no equivalents to the Blaine amendments in 1572 or 1627 in 
France—in which case, we learn that the amendments have nothing to do 
with an aversion to French Huguenots.  We now see the problem: It would 
be an arduous task to list all the moments in history in which there were no 
such amendments so that we may exclude those moments as contributing to 
the creation of the amendments. 
 
154. See id.  
155. Id. at 1463-64.  
156. Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 495 (2003). 
157. Id.  
158. Id. at 507 n.49.  
159. Id. at 509-10.  
160. Steven G. Calabresi et. al. supra note 153, at 1477 (footnote omitted). 
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To use a more obvious and relevant example, consider if the authors 
had searched for state constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage. 
They would find none; could they conclude from this “finding” that a belief 
in heterosexual marriage was not “really deeply rooted” in 1789?  I think 
not.161 
The fallacy of anachronism occurs in one particularly egregious form 
almost every day in both public and scholarly debates over modern 
constitutional questions.  The fallacy occurs anytime someone asks, “What 
would the Founders do?”  Or “What would James Madison think?”  I 
suspect that most scholars who speak and write in these terms do so for 
simplicity’s sake.162  Even the professional historians in the Heller amicus 
brief could not resist the temptation of making such a claim.163  The 
inescapable truth is that we just don’t know.  We can only ask questions 
such as, what principles did the Founders’ espouse?  Then we must do our 
best to apply those principles to modern problems.  But we cannot claim to 
know what they would have done only had they known of our modern 
problems.  Perhaps the Founders would have changed their minds entirely 
about the proper scope of the Fourth Amendment had they framed it against 
the backdrop of NSA metadata collection.  But it’s fruitless, and 
anachronistic, to speculate. 
B. FALLACY OF PRESENTISM 
The fallacy of presentism is particularly important for originalist 
historians.  It is a “complex anachronism, in which the antecedent in a 
narrative series is falsified by being defined or interpreted in terms of the 
consequent.”164  It consists in the “mistaken idea that the proper way to do 
history is to prune away the dead branches of the past, and to preserve the 
green buds and twigs which have grown into the dark forest of our 
contemporary world.”165  Fischer’s examples are of historians who make 
 
161. Another question is whether state constitutions is a place to look to answer the authors’ 
question in the first place.  We might recall that the Framers did not want a Bill of Rights because 
they were afraid that by enumerating them, that would imply other fundamental rights (those 
deeply rooted ones) might not be protected.  
162. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, What Would Hamilton Do?, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 259 (2012).  
163. Brief of Rakove et al., supra note 64, at 36.  They recognize that it “can be tricky to 
answer” questions about “what the Founders would think about various aspects of contemporary 
life.”  Id.  And yet they proceed to venture a confident answer on their particular question: “But as 
the historians of the Revolutionary era we are confident at least of this: that the authors of the 
Second Amendment would be flabbergasted to learn that in endorsing the republican principle of a 
well-regulated militia, they were also precluding restrictions on such potentially dangerous 
property as firearms . . . .” Id. 
164. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 135.  
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the conscious choice to look only to those past threads in history that have 
been most influential on the modern world.166 
Several examples arise where the author seems unaware that he is 
defining the antecedent in terms of the consequent.  An example occurs in 
the dissent in Printz v. United States.  To bolster his argument that the state 
officers engaged in federal executive functions and thus the Constitution 
contemplated a commandeering power, Justice Stevens wrote, “[T]he First 
Congress enacted legislation requiring state courts to serve, functionally, 
like contemporary regulatory agencies in certifying the seaworthiness of 
vessels.”167  Such agencies are part of the modern executive branch.  More 
specifically, Stevens argued, “The statute sets forth, in essence, procedures 
for an expert inquisitorial proceeding, supervised by a judge but otherwise 
more characteristic of executive activity.”168   
Justice Scalia rightly attacks this mode of reasoning: the dissent’s 
assertion “is cleverly true—because contemporary regulatory agencies have 
been allowed to perform adjudicative (“quasi-judicial”) functions. . . . It is 
foolish, however, to mistake the copy for the original, and to believe that 
18th-century courts were imitating agencies, rather than 20th-century 
agencies imitating courts.”169  In other words, the dissent tried to show that 
state judges did executive functions by showing that many of the functions 
they performed are today considered executive.  But this commits the 
fallacy of presentism by defining the antecedent judicial precedent in terms 
of the consequent role of executive agencies. 
For his part, Justice Scalia commits the same fallacy in the very same 
opinion!  In response to Justice Souter’s reliance on a passage in The 
Federalist that would seem to imply that executive officers—but also state 
legislatures—can be commandeered, Scalia wrote that a “problem” with 
this “reading is that it makes state legislatures subject to federal 
direction.”170  This reading is problematic for Scalia because the Court had 
recently held “that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction.”171 
Justice Scalia has committed the fallacy of presentism: He has defined the 
antecedent (whether commandeering was constitutionally permissible in the 
past based on a contemporaneous statement) in terms of a consequent (a 
later Supreme Court decision).  It is fallacious to conclude that Hamilton’s 
 
166. Id. at 136 (discussing John Herman Randall’s The Making of the Modern Mind); id. at 
137 (discussing Bernard Berenson’s Aesthetics and History); id. at 138-39 (discussing Geoffrey 
Barraclough’s History in a Changing World).   
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170. Id. at 912.  
171. Id.  
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statement cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by the dissent merely 
because of a holding of the Court nearly two hundred years later.  As 
Wesley Campbell has written, although Scalia’s statement is true in light of 
the subsequent Supreme Court decision, Hamilton’s statement in The 
Federalist “would hardly be inconsistent with Hamilton’s views” on 
“commandeering of state legislatures.”172 
The fallacy occurs when, in Alden v. Maine’s predecessor case 
Seminole Tribe,173 the dissent colored its view of sovereign immunity at the 
founding—the antecedent—with the particular conception of sovereign 
immunity in the Eleventh Amendment—a consequent.174  But as Caleb 
Nelson has argued, the Eleventh Amendment was written in terms of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, possibly for a number of good reasons; 
sovereign immunity generally, however, was considered a matter of 
personal jurisdiction.175  In the dissent’s version of history, the “antecedent 
in a narrative series is falsified by being defined or interpreted in terms of 
the consequent,” and thus commits the fallacy of presentism.  All of this is 
not to say that evidence marshalled by either side was not useful; it’s not to 
say that this problem was not amenable to historical resolution; the point is 
rather that the evidence would have been much more meaningful if older, 
unfamiliar, and forgotten concepts had been unearthed. 
Originalists and other legal historians commit a slightly different form 
of the fallacy that stems from an inability to see that the past world was 
often so different from the contemporary world and that we are myopically 
searching only for elements familiar to our modern eyes and ears.  The 
result is that we often miss those elements directly relevant to the 
development of the modern concept over time because they look unfamiliar 
in their historical forms.  Two examples from the originalist literature, I 
think, might display this fallacy at work: the histories of executive power 
and of judicial review. 
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein may have identified this fallacy in 
the work of many unitary executive theorists.  They argue that where 
modern unitarians see only “executive power” in the Vesting Clause of 
Article II, the founding generation understood there to be an “executive” 
power and an “administrative” power.  This lost distinction would explain 
why several clauses in Article II seem redundant today: If the President has 
all “executive” power, why must he have the enumerated authority to 
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demand the opinions of department heads, unless some of those 
departments were not purely “executive” in nature?  It also explains 
Congress’s original distinction between the departments of war and foreign 
affairs—to be led by principal officers removable by the President—and the 
department of Treasury, led by a department head that was not directly 
removable by the President.176  Of course, it may be that they are the ones 
committing an anachronism, as Calabresi and Prakash point out, by seeking 
in the framers’ understanding a notion of “administrative power” taken 
from the nineteenth (or twentieth), not the eighteenth, century.177 
Philip Hamburger devotes an entire book purporting to correct the 
misconception of judicial review created by the fallacy of presentism in 
much of the conventional history on judicial review.  This history and its 
implications, Hamburger explains, “rest on the fragile assumption that there 
is little evidence of judicial review from the decade and a half after 1776” 
and before, and so the conventional history concludes “that American 
judges must have created this power.”178  More specifically, these histories 
conclude that John Marshall is the “founding father of judicial review” and 
Marbury v. Madison “its authorizing text.”179 
There are variations on this theme, but all essentially agree that the 
doctrine seems to have been created by American judges.  To cite some 
examples, Gordon Wood wrote that it was the reaction to legislative 
supremacy in the 1780s that led to a “new appreciation of the role of the 
judiciary” and to a “growing recourse to judicial settlement.”180  Elsewhere 
he has written that the origins of judicial review “had to flow from 
fundamental changes taking place in the Americans’ ideas of government 
and law.”181  Jack Rakove argued that it was a “puzzle . . . to understand 
how the quarter-century after the adoption of the first state constitutions 
made possible so significant a departure in American thinking about the 
nature of judicial power,”182 and that “before judicial review could become 
legitimate, Americans first had to accept a concept of judicial independence 
that they could not have easily formulated, much less endorsed, before the 
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Revolution.”183  Others similarly maintain that the power of judicial review 
was nowhere present in the Constitution, and so it had to be invented by 
American judges.184 
All of these scholars could not find much evidence of judicial review in 
the 1780s and 90s, let alone before the Revolution, because they were 
looking for a peculiarly modern conception of something which has 
subsequently become known as “judicial review.”  Yet that is not 
necessarily how the founding era’s judges would have thought about their 
acts striking down laws as contrary to some higher law.  As Hamburger 
explains, 
[T]he problem is not so much evidentiary as conceptual.  The 
trouble arises from the very notion of judicial review, which is a 
concept so tightly focused on modern concerns that it renders 
many of the early decisions almost irrelevant.  If judicial review is 
today considered prototypically a review of legislation, then early 
decisions about executive and judicial acts do not appear very 
central.  Similarly, if judicial review is associated with cases, then 
other types of decisions, such as resolutions and advisory opinions, 
seem anomalous.185 
Once we recognize the terms and context in which judges in the 
eighteenth century would have understood their actions—in the terms of 
judicial duty rather than review—Hamburger argues that all of the 
evidentiary problems evaporate.  All of a sudden, judicial review is merely 
one component of a robust tradition of deciding cases in accord with a 
certain duty which, even though it usually did not include striking down 
legislative acts, took but a mere extension to encompass judicial “review” 
of legislation.  “With this conceptual adjustment,” writes Hamburger, “what 
was previously little more than an evocative blur becomes an expansive and 
well-defined landscape, filled with vivid details.  The evidence . . . thus 
requires a change in paradigm—a return from the modern notion of judicial 
review back to the old, forgotten ideal of judicial duty.”186 
Hamburger demonstrates throughout his book how English judges had 
a duty to act in accord with the law of the land, a duty which led them often 
to strike down custom inconsistent with common law,187 corporate acts 
inconsistent with corporate charters,188 royal acts inconsistent with the “law 
 
183. Id. at 1034.  
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of the land,”189 acts of a single house of parliament,190 and occasionally 
colonial acts.191  A vocal minority even believed that acts of parliament 
could be thus declared unconstitutional.192  “There was no need[, therefore,] 
for an American development of a new judicial power, let alone a 
revolutionary creation of such a power, for the ideals of law and judicial 
duty endured within the framework of the common law.”193  It was this 
notion of “judicial duty” that “gave Americans a formal mechanism for 
enforcing constitutional law against all parts of government.”194 
If Hamburger is right, he has identified a kind of fallacy of presentism 
in the literature.  The historians who claim that judicial review was a radical 
departure or innovation, or something invented by Marshall or by American 
judges in the 1780s and 90s, miss the broader picture because they are 
looking for something modern—a concept of judicial “review” of 
legislative acts—that was in fact but a small and necessary extension of a 
much broader concept of law that no longer resonates to modern ears. 
C. FALLACY OF TUNNEL HISTORY 
The fallacy of tunnel history consists in “‘split[ting] the past into a 
series of tunnels, each continuous from the remote past to the present, but 
practically self-contained at every point and sealed off from contact with or 
contamination by anything that was going on in any of the other tunnels.”195 
It might manifest, for example, in the idea that everything can be explained 
by economic history, or by military history, or by political history, without 
understanding that these “tunnels” are not in fact self-contained.  Believing 
otherwise can lead to the commission of numerous fallacies, such as 
fallacies of factual significance or question-framing. 
Tunnel history is not the same thing as proving what you set out to 
prove because of your precommitments; but one manifestation of tunnel 
history is defining something as essentially one thing or another because of 
an unwillingness to see many threads in history interact.  We can think of 
numerous constitutional theorists who seem to believe that the Constitution 
is a representation of only one particular historical thread.  The view that 
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the Constitution represents essentially Lockean liberalism,196 or the view 
that the Constitution represents essentially classical republicanism,197 or the 
view that the Constitution is an overwhelmingly democratic, process-
oriented document,198 all come to mind. 
VII. FALLACIES OF GENERALIZATION 
All historians generalize.  To ask whether a historian should generalize 
is as silly, writes Fischer, as asking whether he should use words.199 
Nevertheless, generalizations are often abused.  Fischer defines a 
generalization as a statement “of statistical regularity,” or a “descriptive 
statement which is inferred from particular facts by a special process of 
reasoning” that “explains what, how, when, where, and who,” though often 
not why.200  The fallacies of generalizations that historians commonly 
commit “consist in a confusion of quantitative and impressionistic 
procedures”; they are all “procedural errors, by which false inferences are 
derived from true particulars.”201  We shall see that originalist historians are 
not immune from these fallacies.  But the important point to remember is 
that all historians commit them, and so all historians can become better by 
avoiding them—including originalist historians. 
A. FALLACY OF STATISTICAL SAMPLING 
A fallacy of statistical sampling occurs in generalizations “which rest 
upon an insufficient body of data—upon a ‘sample’ which misrepresents 
the composition of the object in question.”202  We might guess that this 
fallacy is particularly relevant to originalist historians because they tend to 
focus on just what a few Federalists thought.  To be sure, there is some 
justification for doing so, if we believe that what these few Federalists 
thought were likely to reflect or to influence what intelligent readers of the 
period thought.  Thus, focusing on what these Federalists thought could be 
consistent with a theory of originalism that centers on the understanding of 
a hypothetical reasonable and knowledgeable observer.203  This focus might 
be less meaningful for an originalism that centers on the original public 
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meaning, however—a meaning that does not assume reasonable and 
knowledgeable observers but rather actual people with actual 
understandings.204  For that theory, the evidence from the ratifying 
conventions is much more likely to be important.  Of course, when it comes 
to more impressionistic points—such as the general principles and aims of 
the Constitution—what a few Federalists thought might be more important.  
So long as one is clear on what one is seeking to answer, and on the 
limitations of the evidence, it may not be unreasonable to rely on what just 
a few Founders thought. But this practice might occasionally, and 
unsurprisingly, be abused.205  This fallacy must be avoided meticulously 
because critics of originalism often charge its proponents with cherry-
picking facts to suit their particular legal agendas. 
B. FALLACY OF THE LONELY FACT 
The fallacy of the lonely fact is an extension of the previous fallacy but 
“deserves to receive special condemnation.”206  “It may be defined as a 
statistical generalization from a single case.”207  We can use the same 
example from before: making broad generalizations from the views of a 
single founder.  There are many accounts of executive power, especially 
from the conservative perspective, that depend very heavily (though not 
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necessarily exclusively) on the views of Alexander Hamilton.208  But the 
liberals commit this fallacy, too.  At least two scholars, for example, have 
relied solely on Federalist No. 77 as a “refutation” of a Hamiltonian unitary 
executive theory because Hamilton seems to say that displacing Federal 
officers would require the approval of the Senate.209 
This fallacy is not committed just by originalists; it can be committed 
by all legal thinkers who use history to make an argument.  Ronald 
Dworkin was no exception.  In Law’s Empire, he claimed that the Framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to desegregate 
schools; his evidence is a single statement from the floor manager of the 
1866 Civil Rights Act.210  Originalist historians and judges should be 
particularly careful to avoid this fallacy of the lonely fact. 
C. FALLACY OF STATISTICAL SPECIAL PLEADING 
The fallacy of special pleading is a particularly insidious fallacy.  It 
“occurs whenever an investigator applies a double standard of inference or 
interpretation to his evidence—one standard to evidence which sustains his 
generalization and another to evidence which contradicts it.”211  Fischer 
offers an example in David Donald’s The Politics of Reconstruction,212 in 
which the author tried to argue that Republicans in safe districts tended to 
be radical and those in competitive districts tended to be moderate.213  The 
problem was that the evidence showed that both moderate and radical 
republicans won elections by nearly identical margins (about 59 percent).214 
Donald, however, 
proceeded to “interpret” his evidence until it conformed to his 
hypothesis.  He argued that in some states, where there was an 
allegedly powerful Republican organization, a majority of 52 
percent was security itself for a radical, but that in another state, a 
majority of 58 percent was too small to serve the same purpose. 
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One qualification was heaped upon another with an industry and 
an ingenuity which were worthy of a better cause.215 
One example arises in a different amicus brief in Heller.  In the Brief 
for Professors of Linguistics and English, the linguistics professors seem to 
explain away usages of the phrase “to bear arms” when not used in a 
military context and apply a different standard when analyzing those 
occurrences in a military context.  They write: 
 Examples of the idiomatic usage of “bear arms” during the time 
of the founding abound. In each instance where “bear arms” (or 
“bearing arms” or “bear arms against”) is used without additional 
language modifying the phrase, it is unquestionably used in its 
ordinary idiomatic [military] sense.  It is only in usages where 
additional specifying language is added, such as “bear arms for the 
defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or 
for the purpose of killing game,” that any intent to bend, even 
change (in the case of killing game), the idiom is apparent. 
 For example, the Declaration of Independence denounces the 
British monarch for “constrain[ing] our fellow Citizens taken 
Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country.”  No 
one doubts that “bear Arms against” in that passage means “to be 
engaged in hostilities with.”  In a later echo, Thomas Jefferson, as 
Secretary of State, wrote in dissent from advice by Alexander 
Hamilton and Henry Knox to President Washington . . . : “[A]nd if 
the suggestion be true . . . it is equally true that more than ten times 
that number of Americans are at this moment on board English 
ships of war, who have been taken forcibly from our merchant 
vessels, at sea or in port wherever met with, & compelled to bear 
arms against the friends of their country.”216 
A suspicious special pleading has occurred here.  The linguists explain 
away other usages of “to bear arms” by claiming that those other examples 
are qualified or modified by “additional specifying language,” such as bear 
arms for the defense of themselves or for the purpose of killing game.  And 
yet they refuse to apply this same “additional specifying language” standard 
to the use of the phrase that they prefer: bearing arms against the state or 
against an enemy.  Only these latter examples have military connotations; 
yet they are equally modified by “additional specifying language,” namely, 
 
215. Id. at 112.  
216. Brief for Professors of Linguistics & English Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D. et al. in Support of 
Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157194, 
at 20-21 (citations omitted).  
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against the state or against an enemy.  After all, the Second Amendment 
does not say, “the right of the citizens to keep and bear arms against . . . .” 
Why the military uses modified by “against” are the “ordinary” usage, 
whereas only the non-military uses contain “additional specifying 
language,” is unclear.  The linguists have committed the fallacy of special 
pleading. 
VIII. SOME LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This article has shown throughout that certain methodological errors 
commonly occur in originalist literature and judicial opinions of all political 
persuasions.  History is not easy to do properly, but if originalists avoid 
these errors, then valuable and correct historical conclusions are possible.  I 
have not meant to suggest that any particular judges or scholars will have to 
revise their ultimate conclusions on sovereign immunity, commandeering, 
judicial review, the Second Amendment, and the like, but that their 
reasoning would be significantly improved by correcting the existing errors 
pointed out here.  Sometimes historical conclusions might even change as a 
result. 
This article has also aimed to show, then, that criticisms of “law office 
history” are overblown.  It is true that when litigants use history they will 
often use it selectively to aid their clients.  But that does not mean that 
judges and academics cannot arrive at correct historical answers using 
proper methodologies.  It also does not mean that professional historians are 
immune from the problems they denounce.  As we have seen, even 
professional historians have committed numerous historians’ fallacies in 
their own briefs to the courts.  But it would be preposterous to suggest that 
historians should not do history. 
David Hackett Fischer’s whole point was that historians frequently 
commit certain errors, and modern historians and originalists are no 
different.  But these errors can be avoided with practice.  Although a much 
more extensive analysis would be required to demonstrate this proposition, 
I suspect as well that originalists need little more to become better and more 
useful historians.  The skills necessary to be a good historian—critical 
thinking, analogical reasoning, proper evidentiary weighing—are skills that 
lawyers and judges use every day.  Judges weigh sources for credibility and 
relevance all the time.  If lawyers cannot do history merely because we are 
not historians, then I wonder whether we really can do this thing called 
“law” at all.  Further, irrespective of the great debate among professional 
historians over historiography and historical methods, the relationship 
between, for example, the Eleventh Amendment and Chisolm cannot be 
disputed no matter what historical methodology one adopts.  With no 
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offense intended to professional historians, it would seem that judges and 
lawyers need not commit to any particular side of the methodological 
debates to come up with historical answers useful to at least some questions 
relevant to the law.   
In sum, if lawyers can and should do history, then there is nothing 
missing from their toolkit other than a guide of common methodological 
errors, which it has been the aim of this article to supply. 
 
